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
THE USE OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND INTELLIGENCE IN A JOINT TASK FORCE
ENVIRONMENT TO FIGHT THE WAR ON DRUGS (U)

BY

Luis A. Cruz

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College of the Department of the Navy



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The Use of Operational Design and Intelligence in a Joint Task Force Environment to Fight the War on Drugs.

Abstract:

This paper will argue for the creation of a national joint inter-agency Task Force organization to combat the primary transnational threat of the 21st century - Drugs. The primary focus for this joint task force will be the effective integration of national resources and theater military manpower and the vigorous use of national intelligence means to fight this threat. The joint task forces' conceptual focus on the war on drugs calls for the use of operational design concepts to define, bound and tackle the problem. The model for the task force is centered around a joint military task force similar to that formed to respond to a serious military crisis. The national level Joint Task Force's primary mission will be to oversee counter-narcotics budgets, levy requirements, set priorities, deconflict duplication and coordinate with all other federal and military organizations.

The rationale for using operational design concept to attack the drug trafficking problem is twofold, one, to better employ all available resources in a joint task force environment and two, to accurately identify and target the drug trade's strengths, vulnerabilities and centers of gravity. The intent is to methodically analyze drug trafficking problem from a military perspective using operational design as a framework to see if the problem can be approached from yet another direction. There needs to be particular emphasis placed on the use of intelligence, specifically strategic intelligence. Strategic intelligence opens up windows into the traffickers compartmentalized world which if correctly exploited can lead to forcing the traffickers to change their *modus operandi*, assume greater risks to do business or the most desirable situation of all - closing down their whole operations

The war on drugs is not a one year or five year fight but, a long-term phased approach leading to the neutralization of the drug cartels and the reduction and hopeful elimination of the illegal drug problem. The strategy can't be abandoned at the end of a year or six months due a lack of immediately tangible results or for the purposes of devising a new political strategy or policy. The basis for this concept rests on the realization that the US war on drugs is a less than a decade old, while the consumption and abuse of drugs has been going on since ancient times.

**The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general
conquer the enemy whenever they move and their
achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.**

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

New World Order

The collapse of the bipolar conflict has spawned a series of new threats to US national security interests. We virtually no longer recognize threats to our security as an all-out conventional war in Europe or a nuclear holocaust a la Dr. Strangelove. After almost fifty years of living under the threat of nuclear extinction, we now face a new world order posing other dangers. The recent Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35)¹ specifically identified Terrorism, Illicit Narcotics, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons proliferation as the most egregious threats to our national security. While we are frequently subjected to reminders of indiscriminate terrorist killings, and the threat of another nuclear North Korea or Iran, no image is more vivid or immediate than the flagrant drug related shoot-outs between teenagers and their innocent victims on our city streets.

Today drugs have deftly woven their way into the world's economic, political and security infrastructures and are adversely affecting the health and welfare of people around the world. No country can claim immunity to the plagues that illicit drugs are spreading on the landscape and people and no where else is that damage more evident than in the cities, suburbs and towns of the United States where, day after day, children and adults of all social strata are willing to kill and be killed for the questionable privilege of acquiring and abusing cocaine, crack, crank, ice, speed or and of the other various illegal substances.

A military approach to the war on drugs.

This paper will argue for the creation of a national joint inter-agency Task Force organization to combat the primary transnational threat of the 21st century - Drugs. The primary focus for this joint task force will be the effective integration of national resources and theater military manpower and the vigorous use of national intelligence means to fight this threat. The joint task forces' conceptual focus on the war on drugs calls for the use of operational design concepts to define, bound and tackle the problem. The model for the task force is centered around a joint military task force similar to that formed to respond to a serious military crisis. The focus on operational design principles and other military terminology does by no means advocate a "shoot them out of the sky or an invade sovereign territory" approach as portrayed in a popular Hollywood movie based on Tom Clancy's fictional novel², but a firm military-type approach to the war on drugs.

The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996, provides a new direction to defend US national security interests from the threat posed by the spread of illegal narcotics. This new policy document focuses on five strategic goals and accompanying objectives to fight the drug war.³ The first three goals of this strategy are best satisfied through a combination of education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and local law enforcement programs geared towards decreasing consumption and reducing the associated criminal behavior and preventing drug use recidivism. These goals will only be addressed in general terms to illustrate the new policy's overall direction and focus.

Goal 1: Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse;

Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence;

Goal 3: Reduce health, welfare and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use;

The last two goals with their specific objectives, in my opinion, are the cornerstone of the Strategy since they provide the guidance and direction to draw the battle lines to fight the problem, safeguard our citizens and take back our streets.

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Objective 1: *Identify and implement options, including science and technology options, to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, especially along the Southwest Border.*

Objective 2: *Lead efforts to develop stronger bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing to thwart the use of international commercial air, maritime, and land cargo shipments for smuggling.*

Objective 3: *Conduct flexible interdiction in the transit zone to ensure effective use of maritime and aerial interdiction capabilities.*

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

Objective 1: *Destroy major trafficking organizations by arresting, convicting, and incarcerating their leaders and top associates, and seizing their drugs and assets.*

Objective 2: *Reduce the foreign availability of drugs through eradication and other programs that reduce drug crop cultivation and through enforcement efforts to attack chemical, money laundering, and transportation networks that support trafficking organizations.*

Objective 3: *Reduce all domestic drug production and availability and continue to target for investigation and prosecution those who illegally divert pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals.*

Objective 4: *Increase the political will of countries to cooperate with the United States on drug control efforts through aggressive diplomacy, certification, and carefully targeted foreign assistance.*

Objective 5: *Strengthen host nation institutions so that they can conduct more effective drug control efforts on their own and withstand the threat that narcotics trafficking poses to sovereignty, democracy, and free-market economics. In the source countries, aggressively support the full range of host nation interdiction efforts by providing training and operational support.*

Objective 6: *Make greater use of multilateral organizations to share the burdens and costs of international narcotics control to complement the efforts of the United States and to institute programs where the United States has limited or no access.*

The goals and their specific objectives represent a step in the right direction, past drug control strategies focused on "winning quick victories" by emphasizing coca crop eradication or substitution and a "brute force" approach to interdiction. As the traffickers become more sophisticated and diversify their transportation and distribution procedures, more reliance must be placed on technological means to expose their new modes and routes of operations. There needs to be particular emphasis placed on the use of intelligence specifically strategic intelligence. While law enforcement authorities prefer tactical intelligence that allows them to put criminals behind bars, more reliance should be placed on the strategic nature of the problem. Strategic intelligence opens up windows into the traffickers compartmentalized world which if correctly exploited can lead to forcing the traffickers to change their *modus operandi*, assume greater risks to do business or the most desirable situation of all - closing down their whole operations.

While discussing drug control operations in the South Florida area, James Milford, head of DEA's Miami Field Office commented, "The trafficker of the '90s is much more sophisticated, and probably more well-educated, a person that is well-schooled in the concept of operations and what rules he has to follow". His fitting description of today's drug trafficker is analogous to a *soldier* embarked upon a mission, albeit a soldier for fortune [sic], one well founded in the principles of operations that military commanders regard as essential to carry out successful missions. Just as a military commanders use operational art concepts to define a problem, I will attempt to apply the concept of *operational design* to bound, define and propose a possibly different approach to the illicit drug trafficking problem.

National Drug Control

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) which was created to integrate national, state and local resources to tackle the rising drug threat has been provided with increased funding and responsibility to carry out the Administration's anti-drug strategy. Over the past four years this organization has met with limited success in

integrating the diverse and capable assets our nation has to offer, in part because of the lack of budgetary oversight over the different entities committed to the war on drugs. In order to better attack the problem there needs to be a totally integrated approach on the war on drugs. This need can be translated into the creation of an overall national level Joint Task Force to oversee counter-narcotics budgets, levy requirements, set priorities, deconflict duplication and coordinate with all other federal and military organizations.

Today due to budgetary constraints agencies or departments do not have the luxury of looking at the same problem from different points of view only to arrive at the same solution with their own parochial spin. The time has come to eliminate duplication and combine the best of our resources and personnel to maximize our efforts against the confirmed target - drug trafficking. The proposed organization, a national level joint inter-agency task force with budgetary oversight, but not operational control of the participating entities, would operate under the auspices of the National Command Authority and the ONDCP. Counting with the full participation, coordination and cooperation of individual agencies, departments and the appropriate regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs), it would levy requirements, set priorities and coordinate resources among its participating elements.

The idea of establishing a task force to fight drug trafficking is not novel, at least three such task forces already exist, Joint Inter Agency Task Forces (JIATF) East, JIATF West and JTF 6. JIATF East located in Florida is responsible for coordinating all federal drug control measures on the East Coast of the US and throughout the Caribbean. JIATF West located in California coordinates drug control measures on the West Coast and in the Pacific Basin area in coordination with the US Pacific Command. Both organizations are headed by a Coast Guard admiral and staffed by DOD, DOS, CIA and federal law enforcement personnel who coordinate with state and local law enforcement entities. Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) in Texas is primarily a military organization, while the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a DEA-led multi-agency organization which also coordinates certain aspects of its law enforcement activities with state and local agencies.

The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) located in central Pennsylvania established late 1993 was nominally charged with the responsibility of coordinating and identifying priorities for collection and production of intelligence. Although tasked with these responsibilities NDIC has not been very effective in resolving coordination and duplication problems, mainly due to the competing agencies and their priorities.

Operational Design Concepts:

The rationale for using operational design concept to attack the drug trafficking problem is twofold, one, to better employ all available resources in a joint task force environment and two, to accurately identify and target the drug trade's strengths, vulnerabilities and centers of gravity. Past and present National Drug control strategies have focused their efforts the drug producing countries as well as education and treatment. All these phases of the overall strategy have been well thought out and attempt to solve a monolithic problem, but to my knowledge there has never been an attempt to analyze and attack the problem from a military perspective. The intent here is to methodically analyze drug trafficking problem from a purely military perspective using operational design as a framework to see if the problem can be approached from yet another direction. Operational design is defined as those elements that should exist that one's own forces and assets are employed in a coherent manner⁴. The elements composing operational design are: *Guidance, Objective, Desired End State, Identification of the Enemy's Critical Factors, Direction / Axis, and Operational Idea*

To provide an accurate analytical assessment of the drug problem it is very important to take a step by step approach through the first five facets of operational design in order to arrive at the operational idea or simply said, how best to carry out the plan. Joint Pub 1-02 defines Guidance as "policy, direction, decision or instruction having the effect of an order when promulgated by a higher echelon⁵. It is safe to assume that the President's recently published National Drug Control Strategy 1996 as well as Presidential Decision Directive 35 constitute orders from the highest echelon of our government to

stem the flow of illegal drugs into the country. This order calls upon all sectors of government, not just the law enforcement community, to act vigorously and decisively to accomplish this task.

The objective defined as a tangible or intangible object of action to be taken and whose destruction, annihilation, neutralization, control, seizure or holding is considered essential for the success of the assigned mission⁶. In this context the most important words to note are neutralize, control and seize. As stated before the mission or intent is not to bomb, shot or otherwise cause bodily harm to anyone or anything, the mission is to neutralize the flow of drugs thereby controlling its consumption in the cities and towns of the country. The desired end state in this case is multi faceted, first and foremost the desire to rid our country of the scourge of illegal drugs with its destructive effects on the lives of our citizens and the economy of our nation. Second, it calls on the international community to unite in the fight against drugs and third to bring to justice all those involved in this illegal trade.

Identifying the Enemy's Critical Factors:

To best define the critical strengths, vulnerabilities and the center of gravity a detailed examination of the drug trade is required to answer the basic five questions: what, how, where, who and why. The what although seemingly the simplest question to answer is by far the most complex. Drug Trafficking takes on many forms, the heroin smuggled in from the Golden Triangle, the cocaine from South America (sometimes referred to as the Silver Triangle), the marijuana from Mexico and the Caribbean and the most recent synthetic drug arrivals, domestically produced methamphetamines and foreign made Rohypnol.⁷

Arguments can be made for and against the relative dangers these drugs represent, 1993 statistics show that of 2.7 million hard-core drug users in the US the drug of choice was cocaine, 78.5 % or 2.143 million people habitually abused cocaine while only 21.5%

or 586,000 people reportedly used heroin.⁸ These statistics do not reflect the recreational / social users, estimated at millions more. Therefore, our primary focus should be cocaine.

According to law enforcement authorities an estimated 810 tons of cocaine are produced annually, of which between 300 - 500 tons are destined for US markets. An average 115 tons of the amount destined for the US is confiscated by US interdiction efforts. The remaining amount makes it to US markets and 70% of it enters through the 2,000 mile US-Mexico border.⁹ The largest single US drug control operation netted a record 21 tons of pure cocaine worth upwards of 2 billion dollars on the retail drug market, however within several weeks there were indications that the traffickers were preparing a shipment of another 13 tons of cocaine, indicating an almost inexhaustible supply. Law enforcement debriefings of arrested traffickers have revealed that they are willing to give up as much as 40% of their product (cocaine) as a normal part of doing business¹⁰. (see Diagram 1, Illegal Drug Trade depicts the flow of drugs from coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia to retail distribution in the States.)

Strengths

The drug trade draws some of its strengths from the compartmentation and apportionment of duties within and outside the organization. If an analogy could be made it would be that of several corporations each utilizing the services of a number of specialized "subcontractors" who handle processing, transportation, wholesale distribution and money matters. These "subcontractors" are not linked to any particular organization, but do their work for the highest bidder. Additionally, some if not all of these "subcontractors" work outside their specialized tasks and also may operate legitimate businesses on the side. The drug corporations or drug cartels as they are popularly referred to are, for the most part, branches of legitimate businesses, where the drug business yields a much higher profit margin than the legitimate enterprise. Some of the other strengths inherent in the illegal drug business are:

- the remote regions where the drugs are cultivated and processed offer the traffickers an extremely good measure of sanctuary and security;¹¹

- the chemicals used to process the cocaine are dual use, meaning that they are usually used for legal pharmaceuticals, tanning leather, photographic processing and many other industrial uses;¹²

- the financial gains from this enterprise easily encourages people to accept the low risks associated with the drug trade;¹³

- the usually unstable political and economic environments in the drug producing countries fosters the drug trade;

- the processing, transportation and distribution parts of the trade are very well organized and managed;

- operations are decentralized, therefore making law enforcement more difficult;

- the cartel's leaders have formed strong alliances within the political, military and security organizations in their respective countries, using intimidation, corruption, murder and kidnapping as their instruments of power;

- normally the support host nations provide to US drug control efforts are marginal since the economies of these countries are now dependent on narco-dollars. Additionally many of these countries feel that the drug problem is created by the US demand for drugs and they don't see the US government attacking the consumption side of the equation;

- the worldwide demand and consumption of illegal narcotics is staggering, assuming a 40% loss due to law enforcement actions that still leaves over 400 tons of cocaine alone available for consumption. Added to this are an estimated 150 - 300 tons of heroin and over 11,400 metric tons of marijuana readily available for world markets annually¹⁴.

Weaknesses

While their strengths are many, the drug trafficking problem suffers from just a few weaknesses, these can be summarized as follows:

- the large quantities of precursor chemicals required for the processing of the drugs has always presented the traffickers with the challenge of divining new subterfuges to bring these chemicals into country;

- the ports of entry for chemicals are also a weakness for the traffickers since many of these chemicals are hazardous only certain ports or part facilities will accept them. The traffickers have also been forced, on occasion, to substitute precursors when governments close ports or place bans on certain chemicals from entering their countries in attempts to impact the drug trade;

- although the world consumes hundreds of tons of drugs annually, there is universal condemnation for drugs, dealers and abusers. Morally, this condemnation is the drug traffickers' critical vulnerability and it lends universal legitimacy to the war on drugs;

- while money is considered the drug trade's critical strength, the argument can be made that the money laundering schemes can be the traffickers' Achilles Heel. Dirty drug money has to go through complex and often vulnerable arrangements before it can be safely deposited in the trafficker's coffers, (Diagram 2, *Money Laundering*, portrays some of the more common schemes);

Centers of Gravity

We speak of center of gravity as that object from which the enemy draws all his power, in the case of the drug trade the hub of all power on the strategic level is **money**. Without money there is no incentive for the Peruvian or Bolivian farmer to grow coca for export, no incentive for the transportation syndicates to move the product or the chemists and their assistants to labor in remote labs in the Amazonian jungles. The lure of easy money disappears for government, military and security personnel to protect and do the traffickers' bidding. And without the attraction of large amounts of money, how many legitimate businesses would risk the legal consequences of being involved in an illegal industry? During 1993 Americans spent an estimated \$49 billion on illegal drugs of which \$31 billion was spent exclusively on cocaine.¹⁵ Without the enticement for fast money the children and adults in the inner cities or the Midwestern towns would be less likely to risk their lives over these deadly substances. Of the 1.35 million people arrested in the United States in 1994 a staggering 73.3% were drug related arrests.¹⁶

A convincing argument can be made that the demand for drugs is a secondary strategic center of gravity since without the demand there would be no reason for the drug cartels to operate. Although its a rational argument, I would make the analogy to the Prohibition Act which outlawed all alcoholic beverages in 1920. For thirteen years people found ways to produce, bottle, transport and drink alcohol until the Act was repealed in 1933. Once Prohibition was over big business took it over and created an attachment for alcohol that persists to the present time. The demand will always exist for some type of vicarious pleasure whether drugs, alcohol or other substance. Demand for drugs can be considered the world's critical vulnerability when observed from the drug trafficker's point of view.

On an operational level the centers of gravity are the drug cartels and the drugs themselves. The cartels have been recently vulnerable since the arrest of many of their top leaders. These arrests have had their effect on the drug trade in that each time arrests are made it thrusts the organization into upheaval. The top members of the drug organizations usually have to move their bases of operations, contract more security and be concerned with internal struggles for upward mobility. Furthermore, these arrests usually undermine or ruin long standing personal or financial agreements that the cartels have contrived with politicians, security forces and other competing drug cartels. Although drugs continue to flow seemingly free there is no question that the recent arrests of top leaders of the Cali Cartel have had disrupting effects on drug trafficking operations, labs have been moved further into the Amazonian jungles, remaining leaders have gone underground and they are using different transportation routes. These actions alone will drive up the cost of doing business and consequently drive up the retail price of drugs.

A concerted effort needs to be directed at the US border with Mexico, where most of the cocaine destined for the US passes through. A highly skilled and well organized Mexican group called the Federation is primarily responsible for this smuggling. This organization smuggles drugs, illegal aliens from Central and South America and plays a very important part in laundering drug money. Cocaine is shipped from Colombia to Mexico using large cargo jets or by sea in ocean going ships. These ships then transfer

their cargo onto smaller ships and head for Mexican ports. Once in Mexico the drugs are trucked to safehouses close to the U.S. border. The drugs are stored in safehouses or warehouses near the border until it is determined that it is safe to move into the US in tractor-trailer trucks, recreational vehicles or cars with hidden compartments.

The Joint inter-agency Task Force should strive to invigorate US intelligence gathering to assist interdiction efforts along the US - Mexican border. Although efforts have been started to collect more intelligence in this area, it is still a daunting task to cover the 2,000 mile long border. Using a combination of advanced national technical sensors (SIGINT and IMINT) as well as lower level technology means (HUMINT, RADAR) to detect drug movements from Mexico into the United States, law enforcement authorities would have better chances of interdicting the drugs as they cross into the US in large loads. Increased requirements normally calls for additional funding to buy additional systems, however given the recent de-emphasizing of intelligence targets in the former Soviet Union, I would offer that what is required is a re-prioritization of the targets and a shifting of intelligence collection assets to the drug trafficking problem.

The National Drug Control Strategy calls for action against both of these by cooperating with host nation governments and securing our borders from the flow of drugs. While the enhanced funding for interdiction efforts are sorely needed, a move to assign more resources to the drug war is also required. In this case military resources could provide the force multiplier for the battle. US military forces could train and assist regional military in their interdiction efforts without violating any US laws prohibiting US military forces from conducting direct law enforcement activities.¹⁷

An area where the US military could assist regional forces is in intelligence sharing efforts. One possible way to accomplish this task is by revitalizing the Tactical Analysis Team¹⁸ concept that the US Southern Command used very effectively in El Salvador and other locations in Latin America to assist host nation military forces in their fight against insurgency movements. Working under the auspices of the US Embassy Country Teams the TATs could be very effective in performing important intelligence liaison and

intelligence sharing functions with their regional counterparts. They could serve as a conduit for tactically actionable intelligence that the host countries could use to interdict the production and initial transportation stages of narcotics. These actions are not meant to interfere with other intelligence programs already in existence but merely to complement them on the tactical level. The Joint inter-agency Task Force, the US intelligence and law enforcement agencies could use the locally produced intelligence to build on the big picture thereby creating a defense in depth against the spread of illegal drugs.

Direction and Idea for the future:

The war on drugs is not a one year or five year fight but, a long-term fight leading to the neutralization of the drug cartels and the reduction and hopeful elimination of the illegal drug problem. In order to deal with the problem effectively a phased approach needs to be taken. Although advocating for a phased approach to resolve the problem, some of the phases can run concurrently and /or consecutively and phase termination is also very flexible. The critical stage is phase one where the national level joint task force is created. One basic rule of thumb applies and that is that is a protracted effort, it can't be abandoned at the end of a year or six months for the purposes of devising a new strategy or policy.

- Phase 1: The creation of the national level joint task to oversee all the departments and agencies that involved in the fight against drugs and develop a cohesive long range plan agreed to by the participants;

- Phase 2: Hit the cartels with the first "knockdown punch" by attacking their strategic center of gravity - money. Using all the national level means at our disposal and in coordination with regional allies freeze and interdict the cartels' financial accounts, assets and properties. This attack on the money should be concurrently timed with a heightened state of interdiction of the drugs both on US borders and in concert with our regional allies. The desired effect is to deprive the traffickers of their two main commodities, money and drugs or a means to get either.

- Phase 3: The CinC level / National Joint Task Force relationship is strengthened to forge better working relationships between the national level and the regional allies. Additionally the CinC would assist in molding relationships with regional military forces fighting the drug war through enhanced military to military contacts, intelligence sharing (TATs), Military Training Teams and other nation building efforts. A combined organization consisting of regional allies and the CinC's drug control staff would be established to demonstrate the level of US commitment to the drug war and to freely exchange ideas on how to prosecute the drug war;

- Phase 4: Maintain the pressure on the cartels by stepping up assistance to regional interdiction / security forces in the transit zones and going after the processing laboratories in the jungles. In cooperation with regional allies establish measures to restrict the availability of precursor chemicals to for drug production. Assist our allies to establish positive accountability controls for the chemicals and the quantities destined for legitimate use in the country;

- Continuity phase: maintain the attack on the money and drugs by interdicting them with all US and regional means available. Coordinate with other CinC staffs to ensure that the drug control measures do not have loopholes through which the traffickers can continue their trade. Continue to work with health and welfare agencies to accomplish the prevention, education and treatment goals of the President's drug control strategy.


Conclusion

The recent drug control policy presents a cohesive strategy to deal with a threat to our national security. The proposals offered here represent an attempt to round out some shortfalls observed over the years. Some of these may not represent the politically correct way of doing business, however there is no nice way to approach the war on drugs, either take the battle to the enemy or decide not to fight it once and for all. The basis for this concept rests on the realization that a commander must have certain elements at his disposal when carrying out a mission if he is going to be successful. The strengths, weaknesses and centers of gravity have been thoroughly analyzed and, in the author's

opinion, represent a viable means for attacking the illegal narcotics threat facing the United States.

One aspect of drug control not addressed in this paper is the will of the American people to once and for all rid themselves of the scourge of illegal narcotics. Without the will of the people behind this struggle all efforts to stem the flow of drugs will be marginal. The press, business community, educational system, clergy, parents and government all have to work together and pull in the same direction leaving aside parochial views or political agendas. The tenor of the Administration as regards the war on drugs is that it is affecting our national security and nowhere else is this fact more convincingly evident than in the alarming trend that the number of drug users is going up while their ages are going down.¹⁹

•Illegal Drug Trade



Complex Laundering Process

Diagram 1, drugs from plant cultivation to cocaine retail sales

Money Laundering




Diagram 2, examples of some typical laundering schemes

ENDNOTES

1. The White House, Presidential Decision Directive number 35, (Washington, D.C.: October 1994).
2. Tom Clancy, A Clear and Present Danger, G. Putnam's Sons; (New York : 1991).
3. The White House, The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996; (Washington, D.C.: April 1996), pp. 20-21.
4. The United States Naval War College, Operational Design: The Fundamentals; (Newport: January 1996), p.2.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington, D.C.: March 1994).
6. The United States Naval War College, Glossary of Operational Terms; (Newport: January 1996), p.17.
7. The White House, The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996; (Washington, D.C.: April 1996), p. 45. An estimated 4 million people have tried methamphetamines in the past year and the drug is becoming more popular with young people. Rohypnol has a sedative effect and is reportedly 7-10 more potent than Valium.TM
8. *ibid.* figure 1-1, drugs of preference among hardcore drug users, p. 42.
9. Witkin, Gordon, Stopping Cocaine South of the Border; U.S. News and World Report vol. 120, no. 4 (New York: January 29, 1996), pp. 48-56.
10. The Mexican Drug Federation charges the Colombian Cartels from 25 - 40% of the actual cocaine to transfer the drugs from safehouses in Mexico to the Colombian trafficking network representatives located in various metropolitan areas in the US.
11. Drugs are now being processed in remote areas in the jungles of Colombia and Peru. The clandestine labs are protected by people native to the area creating problems for non-native interdiction forces to surreptitiously enter the area and attack the labs.
12. The following dual-use industrial chemicals are needed to process coca leaves into cocaine: Acetone, Ethyl acetate, Butyl acetate, Hydrochloric acid, Sulfuric acid, Sodium carbonate, Butyl alcohol, Ammonia, Acetic anhydride, Chloroform, Diacetone alcohol, Ethyl ether, Hexane, Methanol, M.E.K., Potassium permanganate, Paint Thinner and Toluene.

13. The United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Washington, D.C.: March 1996) p.6. According to this report 100 metric tons of cocaine are worth over \$10 Billion. A kilo of cocaine normally sells wholesale for between \$10,500 - \$40,000 while heroin sells for \$150,000 - \$250,000 per kilo wholesale.

14. The White House, The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996; (Washington, D.C.: April 1996), Table 5-24, Worldwide potential net production, 1988-1995; p.95.

15. *ibid*, Table 5-16, Total crime, violent crime, and property crime and drug arrests, 1988-1994; p.88.

16. *ibid*. p.41

17. The US federal military forces are prohibited from conducting law enforcement actions unless specifically and on a case by case basis exempted by Executive Order. This is commonly referred to as the Posse Comitatus Act.

18. The first Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) was established in El Salvador by the US Southern Command in the early 1981s to facilitate sharing of actionable intelligence to the Salvadoran Armed Forces. The TAT is normally staffed by three to five language-qualified team members and led by an O3 or O4 who work in the US Embassy under the operational control of the Military Group Commander or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).

19. The White House, The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996; (Washington, D.C.: April 1996). Table 5-8, drug use among 6th, 8th, 9th and 12th graders, 1991-1994; p.82

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